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I. Introduction
The acquisition of profit can be a self-perpetuating process; a
successful expansion of a lucrative enterprise should result in in-
creased gain. Ideally, this process can continue ad infinitum and is as
relevant for the successful sole-proprietor as it is for the largest cor-
porate entity. Unfortunately, these principles are equally applicable
to criminal conduct when the motive for criminal activity is economic
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gain. Whether it results from organized behavior or individual ac-
tions, the white-collar crimes of tax evasion, money laundering, and
securities fraud substantially impact on the U.S. economy. The full
extent of the problem is still being evidenced, and its documentation
is dependent upon a strong investigative tool.
In 1970 Congress provided federal law enforcement agencies
with such a device. The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)I is an effort to alle-
viate the negative impact nationwide criminal activity has on inter-
state and foreign trade. The Act, a delegation of commerce clause
power, authorizes the Treasury Department to mandate detailed rec-
ord keeping and reporting requirements for anyone engaged in
specified currency transactions with U.S. financial institutions.2
These requirements result in a paper trail whereby the transactors'
identities and behavioral patterns become ascertainable. This inves-
tigative scheme is designed to penetrate secret bank accounts of sus-
pected criminals so that potentially inculpatory evidence may be
obtained.
The BSA is a controversial act. Its broad provisions are chal-
lenged as overreaching and impermissible governmental abridge-
ments of legitimate privacy interests. 3 A second problem area arises
from the BSA's preclusion of domestic bank secrecy-criminal finan-
cial activity simply moves offshore beyond the jurisdictional reach of
U.S. agencies. This has led to extraterritorial applications of the
BSA that are controversial and disruptive of U.S. foreign affairs.
This article first discusses these issues and provides an overview
of the Bank Secrecy Act. Section II reviews the need for, and the
structure of, the BSA. A discussion of the issues posed by BSA's
broad provisions follows. The article concludes with a review of the
still current issue-is the Bank Secrecy Act constitutional?
II. Overview of the Bank Secrecy Act
A. Background
The concept of banking in secrecy often invokes images of Swiss
bank accounts. Indeed, the Swiss model, originally intended to pro-
tectJewish accounts from Nazi confiscation, is the prototype for most
modern secrecy law.4 As a general rule, available bank secrecy is
often supplemented by tax laws that impose a zero or low tax rate on
foreign funds held in the jurisdiction. The combined effect results in
the existence of offshore secrecy havens that provide for the confi-
I See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 27-53 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 62-89 and accompanying text.
4 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, CRIME AND SECRECY: THE
USE OF OFFSHORE BANKS AND COMPANIES, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., (1983) [hereinafter cited
as 1983 STAFF STUDY].
[VOL. I11
BANK SECRECY ACT
dentiality of financial and commercial information. Many of these
secrecy havens have statutory prohibitions against disclosure of the
identities of account holders. This prohibition often extends to
identification of the corporate entity that owns the financial institu-
tion.5 The effect of this secrecy is to inhibit and prevent the discov-
ery of the parties having a real interest in the financial transaction.
Thus, financial secrecy precludes effective investigation of suspected
criminal behavior. This problem is compounded when the holder of
the account is a dummy corporation established by the real party in
interest.6
Another feature of these havens is the positive influence finan-
cial secrecy has on the local economy. The availability of confidenti-
ality attracts large amounts of capital, which has a beneficial impact
on local trade and commerce. One example of this ripple effect is
the resultant growth of finance-related service industries such as
legal counseling and business accounting. Therefore, combined
with the investigative obstacles posed by financial secrecy is the fa-
vored status of secrecy laws by local governments because of their
beneficial economic impact. An example of this attitude is the lack of
offshore cooperation that often exists when U.S. criminal investiga-
tors attempt to pierce this cloak of secrecy. 7
Unfortunately, offshore financial secrecy havens, by their nature
and economic effect, serve as sanctuaries and depositories for the
profits of "white-collar" crime. In the 1980s the problem is becom-
ing increasingly complex due to the economics of illegal narcotics
trafficking. 8 The problem is not, however, new. Extensive congres-
sional hearings in 1968 and 1970 documented the close relationship
between secrecy havens and criminal activity. 9 Testimony from sev-
5 Id. at 8.
6 Id. )
7 Id. at 9. Despite a lack of complete agreement the following countnes are gener-
ally considered offshore secrecy havens.
Caribbean and South Atlantic area: Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Vir-
gin Islands, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Grenada, the Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St.
Kitts, St. Vincent, and Turks and Caicos Islands.
European, Middle Eastern and African area: Austria, Bahrain, Channel Islands, Gi-
bralter, Isle of Man, Liberia, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland.
Far Eastern and Pacific area: Hong Kong, Nauru, New Hebridaes, and Singapore. Id.
at 10.
8 See Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies: Hearings Before the Per-
manent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1983) (statement of Senator Roth, Chairman) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Crime and
Secrecy Hearings]; International Narcotics Trafficking: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [herein-
after cited as 1981 International Narcotics Trafficking]; Patterns of Currency Transactions and Their
Relationship to Narcotics Traffic: Hearings on H. R. 5961 Before the Subcomm. on Gen. Oversight and
Renegotiation of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1979).
9 Foreign Bank Secrecy: Hearings on S. 3678 and H. R. 15073 Before the Subcomm. on Finan-
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eral government agencies revealed the nexus between available se-
crecy and the crimes of tax evasion, federal securities fraud, and the
laundering of "dirty" (illegal) profits into "clean" (legal) money.
Each agency reiterated the need for a strong regulatory tool to trace,
investigate, and effectively prosecute the criminal activity evidenced
by these secret accounts.' 0
Much of the testimony presented to Congress focused on how
secret bank accounts create a significant obstacle to investigations of
federal securities law violations. For example, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) traditionally proves security law viola-
tions by tracing the distribution of a security's original issuance to its
destination in the investing public's hands. Conversely, the proceeds
from the distribution are traced back to the promoters. When the
distribution of stock or proceeds is channeled through secret bank
accounts, however, it is impossible for the SEC to acquire sufficient
evidence to establish the identity of those having a beneficial interest
in the issue or of those parties sharing in the distribution proceeds.I
Market operators conceal their purchase and sales through bro-
kerage accounts maintained by foreign financial institutions. Numer-
ous Swiss banks maintain accounts with U.S. brokerage houses and
execute clients' buy and sell orders while maintaining their confiden-
tiality.' 2 A major concern is how this arrangement violates existing
margin requirements, which are considerably lower for financial in-
stitutions. The potential exists for the client to buy and sell on the
coattails of the institution with no effective way to check or document
suspected violations.' 3 U.S.-based operators can also channel their
transactions through the foreign institution by establishing dummy
corporations which maintain secret accounts.' 4 Thus, by relying on
foreign-based market transactions or by channelling the proceeds
from illegal domestic-based transactions into secret bank accounts,
market participants can avoid detection of registration, anti-fraud,
and market manipulation regulations. An added incentive is the abil-
ity to evade payment of taxes on the illegal profits.' 5
cial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., I st Sess. (1970) [here-
inafter cited as 1970 Hearings]; Legal and Economic Impact of Foreign Banking Procedures on the
United States: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Hearings].
10 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959 (1982); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (1982), as
amended by 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5316(a), 5317(b)-(c), 5323 (West Supp. 1985).
11 1968 Hearings, supra note 9, at 9.
12 Id. at 13-14.
13 Id.; see generally 1970 Hearings, supra note 9.
14 See 1968 Hearings, supra note 9, at 15.
15 Id. at 9. The full extent of the problem is difficult to measure due to available
secrecy, but it is relevant to note that in 1969 foreign-based purchases of U.S. securities
totaled nearly $12.5 billion. This total represented almost 9% of the New York Stock
Exchange volume in that year. 1970 Hearings, supra note 9, at 74 (statement of Mr. Homer
H. Budge, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm.).
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During the congressional hearings the SEC expressed consider-
able concern over the effects of this criminal activity on the U.S.
stock market's reputation for honesty, integrity, and fairness. These
standards are safeguards for the investing public, and their absence
poses the risk of significant economic injury to an innocent and rely-
ing public. The repercussions of such injury can result in a worsen-
ing of market conditions which in turn impacts adversely on the
nation's economic well-being.' 6 An additional concern is the unde-
sired leverage represented by the estimated hundreds of millions of
dollars of illegal profits thought to exist in secret bank accounts. A
sudden and undesired influx of this hidden capital would produce
destabilizing market conditions and increase concern over the invest-
ing public's welfare and the nation's balance of payments problem.17
Criminal reliance on offshore secrecy havens, however, is not
limited to those who violate existing securities law.18 Another major
problem is the use of bank secrecy for effectuating transnational
money laundering. Although the process takes many forms, a typical
example was outlined in the congressional hearings. Illegally ob-
tained monies are deposited in a secret bank account in an institution
owned by the criminal entity. The laundering begins with an other-
wise legitimate borrowing of money from the foreign bank by the
original depositor. This money is then lent to an officer of the crimi-
nal entity. There are several benefits from this arrangement. The
financial institution collects the profits from the original loan con-
tract. The corporation, in paying back the loan, deducts its interest
payments on its current tax forms, and the beneficiary of the corpo-
rate loan deducts the interest paid the corporate lender. Most signif-
icantly, the dirty money resurfaces as clean money ready for
legitimate or illegal investment. The inability to pierce both the
bank secrecy and the corporate veil hides the identity of the bank's
real owners in interest and renders federal law enforcement efforts
impotent. 19
One final problem area is noted. Offshore bank secrecy is also
the haven of the tax evader. Even if account secrecy is pierced and
the depositor's identity revealed, a successful prosecution will not
reach the assets housed in the foreign account. For the Internal Rev-
16 1970 Hearings, supra note 9, at 79-81 (statement of Mr. Homer H. Budge, Chair-
man, Sec. and Exch. Comm.).
17 Id. at 247 (statement of Robert M. Morgenthau, New York).
18 1968 Hearings, supra note 9, at 17. Only the lack of criminal imagination limits the
use of bank secrecy. Secret bank accounts have been used by diamond smugglers, loan
sharks, policy operators, bribers of public officials, international spies, and gamblers. Id.
19 1970 Hearings, supra note 9, at 57-58 (statement of Will Wilson, Assistant Attorney
Gen. Dep't ofJustice). The financial press recently reported on a large scale money laun-
dering business based in Panama where millions of dollars were laundered for the head of
a marijuana smuggling ring. Brannigan, Panama Tangle, Wall St.J.. Apr. 17, 1986, at 1, col.
I.
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enue Service, it is- a no win situation further complicated by the high
costs associated with unsuccessful investigation and litigation.20
The conclusion reached by Congress in the early hearings was
summarized by Robert Morgenthau, U.S. Attorney, Southern District
of New York: "Secret-numbered foreign bank accounts have become
an ever increasing widespread and versatile tool for the evasion of
our laws and regulations and for the commission of crimes by Ameri-
can citizens and for hiding the fruits of crimes already committed." 2'
This wave of criminal activity is fostered by the failure of fairly
complete criminal investigations to ripen into prosecutions because
there has been no disclosure of the real parties in interest; investiga-
tors cannot point to any particular individual. Even if identity is re-
vealed, the evidence remains inadmissible hearsay. Most modern
secrecy law prohibits the banker from coming forth with the disclo-
sure. Thus, the prosecution lacks the competent and qualified busi-
ness representative who could state evidence of account information
as a business records exception to the hearsay rule. 22
In response to the public outcry over this reported criminal ac-
tivity and as a means of providing federal law investigators with an
effective investigative tool, Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA).23
B. The Act's Regulatory Scheme
Prior to the enactment of the BSA, the only currency informa-
tion reported to the Secretary of the Treasury was unusual transac-
tions. Compliance was voluntary and penalties were not imposed for
failure to report. In contrast, the Bank Secrecy Act provides for
mandatory recordkeeping and reporting. 24 This regulatory struc-
ture is designed to be used as an investigative tool in the fight against
white-collar crime, and its passage is a broad delegation of com-
merce power to the Treasury Department. Title I of the Act autho-
rizes the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) to require financial
institutions to record vast amounts of information on financial trans-
actions. 25 Title II provides regulatory access to the information via
required reporting by the financial institutions and expressly author-
ized governmental interagency exchange of the accessed
information.26
20 1970 Hearings, supra note 9, at 278-79 (statement of Anatole Richman, former em-
ployee of the Internal Revenue Service with 11 years investigative experience).
21 1968 Hearings, supra note 9, at 1I.
22 Id. at 11-12.
23 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959 (1982); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (1982), as
amended by 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5316(a), 5317(b)-(c), 5323 (West Supp. 1985).
24 31 C.F.R. § 102 (1972).
25 See infra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
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1. Title I Recordkeeping Requirements
Title I of the BSA, as well as the applicable regulations, 27 autho-
rizes the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe recordkeeping regu-
lations for (1) insured banks, or for any person engaged in the
business of check redemption, issuance of money orders, or travelers
checks (2) for persons operating credit card systems or currency ex-
changes or (3) for any institution performing similar, related, or sub-
stitute functions. 28 These requirements are designed to provide
adequate information to reconstruct a customer's financial account
and trace currency transactions within that account. They derive
from a congressional finding that such account information is of sub-
stantial usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations.2 9
This "high degree of usefulness" standard is also the test for the
Secretary's determination that additional records may be required
under Title 1.30
Title I requirements are broadly stated in statutory form, and
are specified in the Code of Federal Regulations. 31 Financial institu-
tions are required to record all major currency or extension of credit
transactions. 32 The identity of any person having a financial interest
in foreign accounts must also be recorded.3 3 The regulations seek to
set up recording systems for tracing all large deposits for up to two
years.3 4 Thus, the institutions must copy the front and back of
checks in excess of 100 dollars. 35 Each financial item transaction of
more than 10,000 dollars that is remitted or transferred to a person,
account, or place outside of the United States must also be re-
corded. 36 This requirement includes recordation of checks or drafts
in excess of 10,000 dollars drawn or issued by a foreign bank which a
domestic bank has paid or presented for payment. 37 These regula-
tions also extend to certificates of deposit. The name, address, and
taxpayer identification number of each purchaser of a certificate
must be recorded along with a description of the instrument, includ-
ing the manner and date of payment. 38 The regulations impose ad-
ditional requirements for casinos and brokers and dealers in
securities. 39 Title I records are to be kept for a period of five years. 40
27 Seegeneralty 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1985).
28 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b(b), 1953(a) (1982).
29 12 U.S.C. § 1951"(1982).
30 Id. § 1953(a).
31 See generally 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1985).
32 Id. § 103.33(a)-(c).
33 Id. § 103.32.
34 Id. § 103.34.
35 Id. § 103.34(b)(3).
36 Id. § 103.34(b)(5)-(6).
37 Id. § 103.34(b)(7).
38 Id. § 103.34(b)(11).
39 Id. § 103.36.
40 Id. § 103.37(c).
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2. Title H Reporting Requirements
Title II of the Act requires financial institutions to report di-
rectly to the Secretary certain domestic and foreign currency transac-
tions. 41 Like the BSA recordkeeping requirements, the reporting
provisions are premised on the congressional finding of their useful-
ness in combatting criminal activity42  and are specified by
regulation. 43
Domestic financial institutions are required to report the pay-
ment, receipt, or transfer of currency in excess of 10,000 dollars. 44
Narrowly defined exemptions to the rule are authorized and condi-
tioned on the institution's reasonable conclusion that the amounts
involved do not exceed amounts commensurate with the customary
conduct of the lawful, domestic business of its client.45 When a U.S.
resident, or a person within and doing business in the United States,
transacts with a foreign financial agency, a report is also required.46
The report includes: the identity and address of the participants to
the transaction, the identity of the real parties in interest, and a de-
scription of the transaction. 47 Recently issued regulations have con-
siderably strengthened this statutory provision to enhance
investigations of offshore criminal activity. These rules authorize the
Secretary to require, at any time, financial institutions located in ar-
eas of "unusual financial activity" to file extensive reports of transac-
tions with foreign financial agencies. 48
The BSA also requires reports on foreign currency transactions
conducted by a U.S. person or a foreign person controlled by a U.S.
person.49 The actual or attempted exportation or importation of
monetary instruments in excess of 10,000 dollars to or from the
United States must also be reported. 50 When a monetary instrument
has been transported without the requisite section 5316 report, or if
41 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (1982).
42 Id. § 5311.
43 See generally 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1985).
44 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) (1985).
45 Id. § 103.22(b)-(c).
46 31 U.S.C. § 5314(a) (1982).
47 Id. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1985).
48 50 Fed. Reg. 27,825 (1985) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.25). These new
rules require extensive reports for checks, drafts, and traveler's checks received or sent by
a respondent financial institution for collection or credit to the account of a foreign finan-
cial agency. Id. at 27,824.
49 31 U.S.C. § 5315(c) (1982). Persons include: individuals, estates, syndications,
joint ventures, incorporated and unincorporated business associations. 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.22(a)(1) (1985).
50 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a) (1982), amendedby Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 901(c), 98 Stat. 2135
(1985). See 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a) (1985) (specific administrative guidelines). A person is
deemed to have effectuated a transportation when he counsels, commands, or requests
that it be done by a financial institution. Id. A U.S. recipient of monetary instruments over
$10,000 mailed or shipped from outside the U.S. must file a report stating the amount,
date of receipt, and the name of the shipper. Id. at § 103.23(b).
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the report contains material omissions or misstatements, the instru-
ment may be seized and is forfeitable to the U.S. government. 51 The
Act provides civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance with Ti-
tle I and II provisions52 and establishes a reward section for informa-
tion that leads to the recovery of a civil or criminal fine, or a
forfeiture exceeding 5,000 dollars. 53
These mandatory provisions reveal the sweeping reach of the
BSA's regulatory scheme. The investigative reach of the statute, the
lack of procedural protection for the clients of financial institutions,
and the statutory authorization of interagency informational ex-
change 54 quickly resulted in challenges to the Act's constitutionality.
III. The Bank Secrecy Act: Issues and Answers
A. Background
Although courts have been reluctant to recognize a privilege of
confidentiality arising out of the bank-client relationship, they have
found a duty of secrecy based on an implied contract between the
two parties.5 5 This duty falls short of express constitutional protec-
51 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b) (1982), amendedby Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 901(d), 98 Stat. 2135
(1985). See 31 C.F.R. § 103.48 (1985) (specific administrative guidelines). The Secretary
of the Treasury may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for a search warrant when
he reasonably believes a monetary instrument is being transported in violation of § 5316.
31 U.S.C. § 5317(a) (1982). See 31 C.F.R. § 103.50(b) (1985) (specific administrative
guidelines). This is the only provision in the BSA that affords any kind of procedural
protection for the affected bank customer. The warrant requirement is expressly waived
for U.S. border officials. Their authority for a search and seizure at a border crossing rests
on a reasonable belief of a § 5316 violation. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5317(b) (West Supp. 1985) (to
be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b)). Congress contemplated that the access afforded to
law enforcement officials would be controlled by existing legal process. S. REP. No. 1139,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970).
52 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321-5322 (1982). All willful violations of any BSA requirement by a
domestic financial institution may result in a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000. 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.47(a) (1985). A failure to report a § 5316 transport of monetary instruments, or a
report containing material omissions or misrepresentations may result in a civil penalty up
to the amounts of the instruments transported less any amount forfeited. Id. § 103.47(b).
Willful violations of Title I recordkeeping requirements can result in a $1,000 fine plus
one year's imprisonment. Id. § 103.49(a). Violations committed in furtherance of any vio-
lation of federal law punishable by imprisonment for more than one year may increase the
fine to $10,000 or imprisonment up to five years, or both. Id.
A willful violation of the Title II reporting requirements may result in a fine up to
$250,000 or imprisonment for five years or both. Id. § 103.49(b). Willful violations com-
mitted as part of a pattern of illegal activity involving transactions exceeding $100,000 in
any 12 month period can result in a $500,000 fine and/or imprisonment of up to five
years. Id. § 103.49(c).
53 31 U.S.C.A. § 5323 (West Supp. 1985) (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5323).
54 Id. § 5319. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.43 (1985) (specific guidelines). Recently, federal
law enforcement officials have announced an interagency agreement whereby the Justice
Department, the F.B.I., the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and
other governmental agencies will make criminal referrals to other law enforcement agen-
cies without providing notice to the affected customer. Pasztor, Protests by ACLU, Bankers,
Congress Stall Plan by Meese to Fight Criminal Money Laundering, Wall St. J., June 12, 1986, at
64, col. 1.
55 See Milovich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Peterson
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tion despite the fact that bank records have been analogized to pri-
vate papers entitled to fourth amendment protection from
unreasonable search and seizure. 56 This analogy is derived from the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Katz v. United States.5 7
The Katz Court held that a subjective and reasonably relied
upon privacy expectation can rise to the level of being constitution-
ally protected if it is determined that society considers such an ex-
pectation reasonable and acceptable. 58 In reaching this conclusion
the Court rejected, as determinative of standing under the fourth
amendment, a test based on a property interest analysis. This rejec-
tion was based on the view that the fourth amendment protects per-
sons as well as areas and effects from unreasonable search and
seizure. 59 Although Katz did not directly address the issue of records
maintained and possessed by a third party, the Court's ruling that
what; a person knowingly exposes to the public is not private and,
therefore, not constitutionally protected, speaks to this issue. If the
confidentiality of the communication is dependent on a person not
disclosing the contents to a third party, then the information is not
entitled to fourth amendment protection. 60 Thus, when a bank cus-
tomer lacks a possessory interest in the account records, third-party
access to the records cannot be challenged on fourth amendment
grounds.
The information contained in those records, however, may still
be considered the property of the client. 61 The characterization of
information as a property right imposes a duty of confidentiality on
the bank to the extent the customer expects the information not to
be disclosed other than in the ordinary course of the bank-client rela-
tionship. This theory underscores the lack of a possessory interest in
the records and reveals that the issue is not one of an actual privacy
interest but rather a legitimate expectation of privacy. The bank cus-
tomer normally expects that his contractual relationship with the
bank will control unauthorized disclosure of account information.
This reasoning underlies the initial challenges to the constitutional-
ity of the Bank Secrecy Act.
v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P,2d 284 (1961). See infra notes 116-121 and
accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977,
125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118
Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974); Milovich, 224 So. 2d at 759; Peterson, 83 Idaho at 578, 367 P.2d at
284.
57 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 353.
60 Id. at 351. See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749-52 (1971).
61 See Milovich, 224 So. 2d at 759; Peterson, 83 Idaho at 578, 367 P.2d at 284.
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B. Issues Arising Under the BSA's Domestic Requirements
1. Constitutional Challenges
In 1972 a diverse group of plaintiffs mounted the first constitu-
tional challenge to the Bank Secrecy Act. The plaintiffs in Stark v.
Connally6 2 were several bank customers, a bank, the California
Banker's Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), suing on behalf of itself and its bank customer members. 6 3
Plaintiffs challenged the Title I and II recordkeeping and reporting
provisions on first, fourth, fifth, ninth, tenth, and fourteenth amend-
ment grounds. 6 4
In considering the Act's validity, the Stark court focused on
plaintiffs' claim that the fourth amendment prohibited governmental
access to BSA records. Plaintiffs claimed that account records are
equivalent to private papers and, thus, invoke the fourth amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. Rea-
sonableness in this context requires customer notification prior to
disclosure. Prior notification protects the privacy expectation by al-
lowing the customer to judicially challenge the requested disclosure.
The three-judge court granted injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, but
only with respect to the Act's domestic reporting provisions.
65
The Stark court easily concluded that Title I and II foreign re-
cordkeeping and reporting requirements are constitutionally valid.
The court based this holding on the fact that these provisions are
narrowly drawn instances of proper congressional regulation of for-
eign commerce. 66 Furthermore, the Act's reliance on procedural
safeguards in this area comports with protection envisioned by the
fourth amendment. 6 7 The domestic recordkeeping provisions were
found to be constitutionally valid pursuant to a balancing test weigh-
ing the burden imposed on private interests by recordkeeping
against legitimate and controlling governmental interests. 6 8 The
Stark court noted two countervailing U.S. interests. Expectations of
privacy in account information are not reasonable when the holder
lacks ownership of the records. Second, the government historically
has enjoyed regulatory, supervisory, and investigative access to bank
records. Recognizing a customer's right to privacy in these records
would negate this historical acquiescence. 69
By invalidating the BSA's domestic reporting requirements the
Stark court shifted from a property interest analysis to an evaluation
62 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
63 Id. at 1244.
64 Stark, 347 F. Supp. at 1244.
65 Id. at 1242.
66 Id. at 1245.
67 Id. See 31 U.S.C. § 5317(a) (1982).
68 Stark, 347 F. Supp. at 1248-51.
69 Id.
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of the customer's subjective expectation of privacy. Based on Katz
the expectation of privacy is legitimate and controlling when deter-
mined to be reasonable and socially acceptable. The court found
reasonable the customer's expectation that the bank would not dis-
close the account information to third parties without prior customer
notification. 70 Because the BSA lacks the procedural safeguards nec-
essary to accommodate this reasonable expectation, the domestic re-
porting provisions were struck down. Furthermore, the court
applied an ends/means analysis, finding the reporting requirements
to be unreasonable when their investigative usefulness was weighed
against the overreaching means used to accomplish that goal. 71
Both parties took a direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.72
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court reversed, holding that
the Bank Secrecy Act is a constitutionally valid and proper regulatory
device. 73
Responding to the substantive due process argument, the Court
ruled that the Secretary's regulations do not impose unreasonable
requirements on financial institutions. 74 Addressing the fourth
amendment claim, the Court held that the mere keeping of records
did not constitute unreasonable search and seizure within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment because the records may be accessed
only by resort to existing legal process. 75 Further, the provisions do
not violate the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination
because "incorporated banks, like other organizations, have no privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination." '76 The party inculpated
by third party disclosure has not suffered self-incrimination. This
same claim as presented by the depositor-plaintiffs was held prema-
ture because the plaintiffs had failed to allege that they had engaged
in transactions that required reporting. The ACLU's claim that the
recordkeeping provisions violated its members' first amendment
protections was also held unjusticiable because there were no allega-
tions that governmental access had actually violated the fundamental
liberties of freedom of speech and association. 77
Thus, the Supreme Court refused to hold that the banks, or the
depositor-plaintiffs, had a protectable privacy interest in the bank's
70 Id. at 1249. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
71 Stark, 347 F. Supp. at 1250. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1948).
Having invalidated the Act on these grounds, the court declined to address the remaining
arguments. Stark, 347 F. Supp. at 1251.
72 California Banker's, 416 U.S. at 21. Direct appeals are permitted for three-judge
district court decisions which invalidate an act of Congress. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1253
(1982).
73 California Banker's, 416 U.S. at 21.
74 Id. at 48.
75 Id. at 52.
76 Id. at 55.
77 Id. at 73-76.
[VOL. I11
BANK SECRECY ACT
business records. This view is buttressed by the depositors' lack of
standing for failure to allege reportable transactions and by the lack
of an unqualified right of privacy for incorporated banks. 78 The
Act's provisions were further validated by the Court's finding that
the amount limitations were adequately described, reasonably delim-
ited, and sufficiently related to the proper goal of enhanced investi-
gative powers for federal law enforcement agencies. 79
By employing doctrines of standing and ripeness of claims, the
Court in California Banker's narrowed the constitutional challenges to
the BSA to fourth amendment and due process arguments, which
were easily dismissed. Two years later, in Miller v. United States,80 the
Court reaffirmed its stance by holding that government access to a
customer's account records is not an unreasonable search and
seizure even if realized through defective legal process and without
customer notification. 81
In Miller the defendant was convicted of operating an illegal still,
functioning as a distiller without having posted bond, possessing 175
gallons of untaxed whiskey, and committing income tax evasion. 82
The convictions were based in part on evidence subpoenaed pursu-
ant to the Bank Secrecy Act. At trial the defendant moved to sup-
press these bank records on the grounds that they were obtained by
means of a defective subpoena duces tecum which resulted in a
seizure violative of the fourth amendment. The district court over-
ruled defendant's motions and admitted the evidence.83 The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that a person's
fourth amendment rights are violated upon defective legal process.8
4
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, re-
versed on the grounds that respondent did not have a protectable
fourth amendment interest in the subpoenaed documents.8 The
Court applied a property interest analysis to reach this result: "[o]n
their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not respondent's
'private papers' ... respondent can assert neither ownership or pos-
78 Id. at 67-68.
79 See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311, 5315(a) (1982) (congressional finding that such
reports are useful for investigative purposes).
80 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
81 Id. at 440.
82 Id. at 436.
83 Id. at 438-39.
84 United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
The Fifth Circuit relied on Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) for the controlling
prohibition against "compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a crimi-
nal charge against him." Id. at 622. The Fifth Circuit held that the government had cir-
cumvented fourth amendment protection by first requiring a third party bank to copy
defendant's record and then obtain agency access via defective legal process. Miller, 500
F.2d at 757.
85 Miller, 425 U.S. at 435, 437 (1976).
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session. Instead, these are the business records of the banks." 8 6
Furthermore, the bank records contained information that the cus-
tomer had voluntarily conveyed to the bank with the knowledge that
the information would be disclosed to the bank's employees in the
ordinary course of business.8 7 Because the customer had no protect-
able fourth amendment rights the case was controlled by the general
rule that a subpoena issued to a third party, for that party's records,
does not violate the rights of the third party's client.88
In Miller the Supreme Court squarely resolved the fourth
amendment privacy issue. One unfortunate result of this decision,
and of the Court's earlier refusal to address the first and fifth amend-
ment challenges, is a continuing tendency to view the issue of the
BSA's constitutionality strictly in terms of privacy interests. This
tendency is illustrated by the wave of federal and state financial pri-
vacy legislation that followed in the wake of the Court's rulings.8 9
2. Federal and State Responses
In the midst of a post-Watergate wave of privacy legislation,
Congress responded to the Court's decisions with the Right to Fi-
nancial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA).90 The Act's name is misleading
to the extent that Congress opted for enumerated procedural safe-
guards in lieu of creating a substantive and legally enforceable right
of financial privacy. The Act enumerates the legal processes avail-
able for federal agency access to a customer's account information.
Access is conditioned upon one of the following procedures: Cus-
tomer authorization, 9' administrative subpoena or summons,92
search warrant,93 judicial subpoena, 94 grand jury subpoena, 95 or for-
mal written agency request. 96 The RFPA prohibits disclosure except
in conformity with these enumerated procedures. 97 The Act also re-
quires the requesting agency to certify that it is in compliance with
specified notification requirements98 which provide for customer no-
86 Id. at 440.
87 Id. at 442-43. "The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that
the information will be conveyed by that person to the government." Id. Thus, the Miller
court added an assumption of risk element to the Katz rule that can establish the legitimacy
of certain privacy expectations. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
88 Miller, 425 U.S. at 444.
89 See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
90 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982).
9' Id. § 3404.
92 Id. § 3405.
93 Id. § 3406.
94 Id. § 3407.
95 Id. § 3420.
96 Id. § 3408.
97 Id. § 3403(a).
98 Id. § 3403(b).
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tification prior to disclosure.9 9 Delays in notification require ap-
proval if the access has been sought via administrative process,
judicial subpoena, or formal written request.100
Proper notice includes a description of the records sought with a
general statement of the inquiry's purpose. The agency must also
explain how the customer may judicially challenge the requested dis-
lcosure.' 0 l Challenges are limited, however, to claims that the re-
quested records are not relevant to the stated purpose or that the
agency has not substantially complied with RFPA's notification re-
quirements.' 0 2 The relevancy test is broad enough to include infor-
mation that may be or may lead to admissible evidence. The
substantial compliance rule only requires satisfaction of RFPA's es-
sential elements and is intended to deny attempts at blocking disclo-
sure due to hyper-technical violations.' 03
RFPA's principal shortcoming is its failure to provide substan-
tive financial privacy. Furthermore, its application is limited to fed-
eral agencies; state and local agencies, organizations, and private
individuals are not required to comply.' 0 4 A third limitation is that
protection is afforded only to individuals or partnerships of five
members or less.' 0 5 These disadvantages reveal that the Act's proce-
dural protections are limited to the legal opportunity to challenge
process. The Right to Financial Privacy Act is not a vehicle for asser-
tion of financial privacy interests because these interests are non-ex-
istent. Thus, the Act fails to respond to the unresolved issues
presented in California Banker's.10 6
On the state level, the response to the Supreme Court's
BSA/privacy analysis has been similar-a qualified recognition of fi-
nancial privacy generally modeled after the congressional model.'0 7
State level recognition of financial privacy flows from three sources:
state constitutions, a common law duty of financial confidentiality,
and state financial privacy legislation.
99 Id. § 3409.
100 Id.
101 Id. §§ 3405(2), 3406(b)-(c), 3407(2).
102 Id. § 3410(a).
103 See Kirschner, The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978-The Congressional Response to
United States v. Miller A Procedural Right to Challenge Government Access to Financial Records,
13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 10, 34-35 (1979).
104 12 U.S.C. § 3401(3) (1982). Even among federal entities the RFPA exempts grand
juries. Id. § 3413(i).
105 Id. § 3401(4).
106 See supra notes 62-79 and accompanying text. It is illustrative to chart the success
rate of procedural challenges mounted under the RFPA. Of the 57 challenges between the
Act's effective date of March 10, 1978, and the end of 1983, only one was successful. AD-
MIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON THE APPLICATION FOR DELAYS AND CUS-
TOMER CHALLENGES UNDER PROVISIONS OF THE RFPA oF 1978, (1979-1983) (available from
the Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Wash. D.C. 20544).
107 See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
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The California Supreme Court in Burrows v. Superior Court held
that article 1, section 13 of the California Constitution provides a
bank customer financial privacy in the bank's records of his other
account. 10 8 The court determined that the depositor had a reason-
able expectation that the bank would maintain the confidentiality of
his account information.' 0 9 A state agency violates this privacy inter-
est when it acquires access to the information without first resorting
to legal process. 110 The bank's proprietary right to the records is
not deemed dispositive because the depositor bases his voluntary
disclosure of financial information to the bank on the reasonable be-
lief that he waives disclosure only to the extent of facilitating the
bank-client business relationship. The customer's privacy interest is
not lessened by bank ownership, and the bank's voluntary disclosure
is not equivalent to customer consent."'I
One year later the California Supreme Court extended this anal-
ysis in Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court. 1 2 Based on its earlier
recognition of a constitutionally protected privacy interest, the court
held that a customer has standing in a civil action to contest disclo-
sure.113 The court's reasoning was grounded in its continued refusal
to allow a third party waiver of the customer's legitimate expectation
of privacy. The assumption is that the institution decides disclosure
requests on the basis of its own set of reasons instead of those of the
client. 1 4 The effect of Valley Bank is a requirement that the bank
take reasonable steps to notify the customer prior to disclosure. It is
only through notice that the customer can exercise his right to chal-
lenge process." 15
A number of state courts have recognized a common law duty of
financial confidentiality. According to the strongest theory, this duty
arises from an implied contract between the financial institution and
the depositor. The leading authority for this rule is an English case,
Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank.'16 Those few courts
that have considered the issue generally accept the Tournier line of
analysis."i 7 Remaining legal theories used to reach the same result
108 Burrows, 13 Cal. 3d at 238, 529 P.2d at 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
109 Id. at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
It0 Id. at 245, 529 P.2d at 594-95, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71.
III Id. at 244, 529 P.2d at 594, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
112 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975).
113 Id. at 658, 542 P.2d at 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
114 Id. at 657, 542 P.2d at 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
''5 Id. at 658, 542 P.2d at 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 556. Other courts have followed the
Burrows analysis. See Charnes v. DiGiocomo, 200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117 (1980); Com-
monwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32,403 A.2d 1283, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1979); Subur-
ban Trust Co. v. Waller, 44 Md. App. 335, 408 A.2d 758 (1979).
116 [1923] 1 K.B. 461.
117 See Milovich, 224 So. 2d at 759; Sparks v. Union Trust Co., 256 N.C. 478, 124
S.E.2d 365 (1962); Peterson, 83 Idaho at 578, 367 P.2d at 284.
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include: property law theory,"18 agency theory,1 9 and a privilege
arising out of the bank-client relationship.120
There are five states which lack statutory recognition of financial
privacy interests.' 2 ' In those states recognizing privacy, none have
substantively fashioned the right. Like the federal model, the more
comprehensive state statutes offer procedural safeguards to chal-
lenge the process that is required for disclosure.' 2 2 Only one goes
further and requires a substantive balancing of the government's
need for access against the customer's privacy interest. 23 The ab-
sence of federal or state legislation affording a substantive right of
financial privacy, coupled with the limited parameters afforded by
duteous confidentiality is, in effect, a recognition of the BSA's broad
constitutional basis. 124
C. Issues Arising Under the Act's International Requirements
The effectiveness of a domestic statute is measured by that
country's jurisdictional limits. Foreign application is available only
at the cost of disrupting international comity or by the expense of
diplomatic negotiation. The Bank Secrecy Act's effectiveness as an
investigative tool is revealed by the interesting history of its extrater-
ritorial application.
1. The Need for and the Difficulty of Piercing Offshore Secrecy
Havens
Federal agency representatives have been unanimous in prais-
sing the effectiveness of the Bank Secrecy Act.' 25 One very success-
ful application of the Act was Operation Greenback. This 1980
investigation was implemented by the Treasury Office of Enforce-
118 See Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (N.J. Ch. 1929) (unauthorized dis-
closure of account information is a violation of the customer's property interest in that
information).
119 See Peterson, 83 Idaho at 578, 367 P.2d at 284 (principal-agent rules govern the
relationship between the bank and its client).
120 Although not accepted by the courts, this legal theory has been discussed in sev-
eral opinions. See, e.g., State v. Hambrick, 65 Wyo. I, 196 P.2d 661 (1948); State ex rel.,
G.M. Gustafson Co. v. Crookston Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 22 N.W.2d 911 (1946); In re
Davies, 68 Kan. 791, 75 P. 1048 (1904).
121 New Jersey, South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming have not en-
acted financial privacy legislation. Comment, Confidentiality of Financial Institution Account
Records Under State Law: Substance or Illusion?, 3 REV. LITiGATION 567, 580 (1983).
122 See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7460-7493 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3 6 -9J- 9 N (WEST 1981 & Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 360 (Smith-Hurd
1985 & Supp.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, §§ 161-164 (1980 & Supp. 1985); MD. FIN.
INST. CODE ANN. §§ 1-301 -305 (1980 & Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-1401, -1402
(1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 239A.010 -. 190 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359C:1 -:18
(1984); OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, §§ 2201-2206 (1984 & Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.550
-.595 (1983); UTAh CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-45 -50 (1977).
123 CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 7461(c) (West 1980).
124 See infra notes 189-198 and accompanying text.
125 See generally 1983 Crime and Secrecy Hearings, supra note 8.
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ment and Operations, the Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Customs
Service, and the Department ofJustice. The operation consisted of a
thirty month integrated investigation of an unusual currency surplus
in the southern Florida Federal Reserve Banks. The task force docu-
mented 2,065 million dollars that had been transnationally laun-
dered by seven separate organizations. The operation resulted in
the seizure of more than $28 million in currency and 2.5 million dol-
lars in property. Another 1.8 million dollars in appearance bonds
was also forfeited to the U.S. Government. As of 1983 there were
140 indictments with forty-four convictions and ninety cases pending
trial. The success of Operation Greenback spawned a new wave of
criminal investigation-at least twenty similar financial investigative
task forces have been established throughout the United States and
Puerto Rico. 126 In another area of enforcement, the Reagan admin-
istration has recently focused on Title II reporting violations by the
financial institutions. Compliance at this level is a prerequisite for
effective tracing of criminal activity.' 27
Recent amendments reinforce the Act's effectiveness. The
shortcomings of the original BSA were brought to Congress' atten-
tion during the 1983 hearings,128 and were rectified with the passage
of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.129
Prior to the enactment of these amendments, Title II of the BSA
contained a serious loophole. The original section 5316 did not re-
quire a report for the "attempted" transportation of reportable
amounts of monetary instruments.' 30 U.S. border officials were
powerless to detain suspected couriers when efforts fell short of suc-
cessful transport. Amended section 5316 requires a report when a
person or his agent or bailee transports, or attempts to transport,
monetary instruments in excess of 10,000 dollars.' 3'
126 Id. at 35-36 (statement of Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Enforce-
ment, Dep't. of Treasury).
127 The Treasury Department fined Crocker National Bank $2,250,000 for failing to
report currency transactions totaling $3.98 billion. Langely & Cox, Treasury Fines Crocker
Unit for Failing to Report Cash Transactions, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1985, at 10, col. 1. First
National Bank was fined $500,000 for failing to report $2.5 billion in currency transac-
tions. Id. Recently, the Treasury Department and BankAmerica corporation were re-
ported to be close to an agreement on a fine that could reach $7 million for similar Title II
violations. Hil & Tharp, Bank/lmerica Is Said Near.Accord on Fine, Wall St.J.,Jan. 3, 1985, at
3, col. 4. The same newspaper reported the conviction of a money launderer who was
sentenced to 35 years imprisonment and fined a total of $6,495,000. Id.
128 See, e.g., 1983 Crime and Secrecy Hearings, supra note 8, at 33-36 (statement of Hon.
John M. Walker, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Enforcement, Dep't of Treasury).
129 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2135 (to be codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5316(a), 5317(b)-(c), 5323) (West Supp. 1985).
130 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1) (1982).
131 Id., amended by Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 901(d), 98 Stat. 2135 (1985). The requisite
amount was raised from $5,000 to $10,000 to reduce paperwork. S. REP. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 302 (1983). This higher amount creates its own enforcement problems.
A recent appeals court decision overturned a conviction based on reporting violations al-
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Under the original BSA, section 5317's warrant requirement was
inconsistent with applicable border search and seizure law.132 The
1984 amendments add a new subsection to 5317 expressly allowing
customs officers to perform a warrantless search of a vehicle, aircraft,
other conveyance, envelope, container, or person entering or de-
parting from the United States upon a reasonable belief of a section
5316 violation. 133
One enforcement problem persists despite regulatory amend-
ments. The problem stems from the time period granted to financial
institutions for filing Title II reports. Originally, the institutions had
forty-five days to file the requested information. This has now been
shortened to fifteen days,' 34 but even this time span is considered
ineffective for tracing and seizing funds which move rapidly through
the transnational laundering process.' 35
The criminal activity portending the 1970 enactment of the
Bank Secrecy Act continues into the 1980s. This is not, however, an
indictment of the Act's effectiveness as a crime fighting tool. The
rapid internationalization of the world economy in the past two de-
cades, coupled with the technological advances in communication
and transportation, have resulted in an increased availability and re-
liance upon offshore secrecy laws. The benefits of the modern age
have had a transnational effect on the crimes of tax evasion, securi-
ties fraud, and money laundering.136
In its amended state the Bank Secrecy Act is inherently flawed
for extraterritorial application by its jurisdictional limitations. For-
eign banks are not subject to its provisions.' 3 7 Increasing reliance
on offshore secrecy has significantly lessened the Act's effectiveness
against the very problem it is designed to treat, and places U.S. en-
forcement agencies in the position of having to pierce local secrecy
laws to obtain admissible evidence. Yet, because of the economic
benefits usually accompanying available secrecy laws, local authori-
ties are reluctant to cooperate with disclosure requests. In the pri-
vate sector, bank officials are statutorily prohibited from disclosing
secret account information.' 38 This lack of cooperation creates ob-
stacles that federal agencies need to overcome.
legedly structured to fall below the $10,000 limit. Wong, U.S. Attorney Weld Takes Tough
Stance on Banks' Cash Reporting Violations, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1986, at 35, col. 1.
132 United States v. Chemaly, 741 F.2d 1346 (11th Cir. 1984).
133 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 901(d), 98 Stat. 2135
(1985).
134 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(a) (1985).
135 1981 International Narcotics Trafficking, supra note 8, at 343-44 (statement of Roscoe
L. Egger, Jr., Comm'r, Internal Revenue Serv.).
136 See generally 1983 Crime and Secrecy Hearings, supra note 8; 1981 Narcotics Trafficking
Hearings, supra note 8.
137 See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959 (1982); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-
5322 (1982), amended by 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5316(a), 5317(b)-(c), 5323 (West Supp. 1985).
138 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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2. Various Solutions to the Problem
a. Compulsory Legal Process: Enforcing the Subpoena Duces
Tecum
In 1976 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a nonresi-
dent alien is subject to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. 139 The
court enforced the subpoena although defendant's compliance sub-
jected him to possible criminal prosecution in his resident country.
Field, a Canadian citizen, was managing director of a bank located in
the Cayman Islands, British West Indies. His testimony was sought
by a grand jury investigating criminal tax evasion through reliance
on offshore secrecy law. Served with the subpoena in the lobby of
the Miami International Airport, Field refused to answer questions
concerning his bank or its clients. His silence invoked the fifth
amendment's prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination and
was grounded on the fact that the requested testimony would violate
Cayman Island secrecy law and subject him to possible criminal
sanctions. 140
Affirming the trial court's enforcement order, the appellate
court determined that Field misconstrued the scope of the fifth
amendment's protection. The constitutional prohibition against
self-incrimination extends only to the use of such testimony. The
mere fact of testifying is, by itself, not a proper subject for invoking
the privilege. "The Fifth Amendment simply is not perintent to the
situation where a foreign state makes the act of testifying a criminal
offense." 141
The court applied a balancing test to weigh the merits of de-
fendant's second claim that enforcement of the subpoena is pre-
cluded by controlling principles of international comity. The test
weighs U.S. legal interests against Cayman Island's interest in main-
taining financial secrecy. 1 42 The court found the need for admissible
criminal evidence to be a vital U.S. interest outweighing a foreign
desire for continued secrecy.' 43 The Field court also recognized the
continuing U.S. interest in allowing wide investigative discretion for
U.S. bank regulators.' 44 Absent specific congressional direction to
the contrary, the court affirmed the enforcement order. 145
A recent federal case extended compulsory process beyond U.S.
139 Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 940 (1976).
140 Field, 532 F.2d at 405.
'41 Id. at 406-07. See also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
142 Field, 532 F.2d at 407. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 39 (1965).
143 Field, 532 F.2d at 407. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (executive
privilege limited by the need for admissible criminal evidence).
144 Field, 532 F.2d at 408. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 435.
145 Field, 532 F.2d at 409.
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jurisdictional limits. The Eleventh Circuit enforced a subpoena is-
sued to a domestic financial institution for production of records
housed in its offshore branch offices. As in Field, principles of inter-
national comity were not controlling.146 A federal grand jury investi-
gating tax evasion and narcotics trafficking issued a subpoena duces
tecum to the Miami branch office of the Bank of Nova Scotia (Bank),
a Canadian chartered institution with branch offices in forty-five
countries. The subpoena named two customers of the Bank and
called for the production of their financial records from any of the
over 1200 Bank offices. Asserting that production would result in
violations of Bahamian and Cayman Island secrecy law, the Bank re-
fused to comply. 14 7 During appellate review the Bank offered three
arguments against enforcement. It contended that the court lacked a
sufficient basis for enforcing the subpoena, that enforcement would
violate due process of law, and that the law of foreign affairs pre-
cluded compulsory process against a non-resident financial
institution. 148
The Bank's first argument relied on the Schofield rule which re-
quires the government to show the relevancy of the documents to a
proper grand jury investigation. The Bank's reliance on this rule was
grounded on the lower court's failure to make this relevancy deter-
mination. Therefore, in the Bank's view, enforcement of the sub-
poena by the court lacked a sufficient basis.149 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reasoned that the Schofield rule was a local rule
flowing out of the Third Circuit's inherent power of supervision. In
declining a similar role, the court noted that the rule is not a consti-
tutionally mandated precondition for enforcement of the
subpoena. 150
The due process argument rested on the proposition that local
secrecy law bars disclosure and placed the Bank in the role of a disin-
terested records custodian. Therefore, the Bank claimed that it was
entitled to a hearing on the merits of the case in order to test the
validity of the subpoena's authority. 151 The Eleventh Circuit dis-
agreed; a prerequisite for the Bank's position is a good faith effort at
compliance with the subpoena, and the appellate court noted the
146 Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
147 Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d at 1388.
148 Id. at 1385.
1,49 Id. at 1387. See GrandJury Proceedings v. Schofield, 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973);
Grand Jury Proceedings v. Schofield, 507 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1015 (1975).
150 Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d at 1387.
151 Id. at 1388. Where a plaintiff has acted in good faith but foreign law blocks compli-
ance, the plaintiff is entitled to a hearing on the merits of the case to test the constitution-
ality of the subpoena's authority. Societe Internationale Pour Participants Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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lower court's finding that the Bank failed to meet this
requirement. ' 5
2
The Bank's final argument was that the trial court had errone-
ously applied the Restatement balancing test in determining control-
ling principles of comity. In an attempt to distinguish Field, the Bank
contended that the U.S. Government should have applied first to the
offshore courts for judicial assistance rather than provoke the disre-
spect of a friendly nation by resorting to compulsory process. Re-
sponding to this argument, the Eleventh Circuit reapplied the
balancing test and found the need for information regarding the "fi-
nancial integrity of the republic" to be a vital national interest out-
weighing a local desire for secrecy.' 53
The court affirmed the enforcement order which had been
stayed for a short period to allow for compliance, and the Bank per-
sisted in its refusal. Only when the stay was lifted and the contempt
fine mounted did the Bank produce the documents. Despite the
Bank's eventual compliance, the district court fined the institution
$1,825,000 for civil contempt.' 54 Both the contempt order and the
fine were appealed. The Eleventh Circuit, citing numerous examples
of the Bank's lack of good faith, upheld the order and ruled that the
district court had not abused its discretion in imposing the fine. 155
During this second appellate review, the Bank claimed a good
faith effort to comply. In reviewing the record, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that the Bank was originally granted a two-month search pe-
riod which it did not use. In lieu of production,, the Bank had at-
tempted to persuade the U.S. Government to resort to the
international discovery device of letters rogatory. Coupled with this
suggestion were requests that the U.S. Government show the materi-
ality and relevancy of the requested documents to the grand jury in-
vestigation. In responding to the Bank's claim, the Eleventh
Circuit's analysis is a reiteration of its position in the earlier case: the
vital interest in obtaining inculpatory evidence outweighs the Bank's
suggested procedural guidelines.' 56 In rejecting the Bank's good
faith claim, the court relied heavily on the fact that the required due
diligence was only forthcoming when the fine began to
152 Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d at 1389.
153 Id. at 1391 (quoting Field, 532 F.2d at 407-08). Essentially the court was relying on
the Field analysis: "[t]his court simply cannot acquiesce in the proposition that United
States criminal investigations must be thwarted whenever there is a conflict with the inter-
est of other states." Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d at 1391.
154 Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Nova Scotia, 722 F.2d 657 (11 th Cir.
1983) ($25,000 per each day in contempt).
155 Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11 th
Cir. 1984).
156 Id. at 825. The grand jury is granted broad discretion in seeking evidence. United
States v. Dionsio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
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accumulate. 157
The second issue on appeal was a re-examination of the comity
issue as set forth in the amicus curiae briefs of Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the Cayman Islands. Canada stressed that the situs of
the requested documents controls the applicable jurisdictional law.
This position is consistent with a tentative draft of the revised Restate-
ment. 158 The Eleventh Circuit ruled, however, that the new test is not
consistent with current U.S. law. Furthermore, the Bank's pervasive
presence in the United States cuts against the logic of the proposed
test. 15 9 The United Kingdom and the Cayman Islands pointed to the
significance of the "gentleman's agreement" that resulted from a
diplomatic exchange between the United States and the Cayman Is-
lands during the Bank's initial two-month search period. The agree-
ment sought to establish procedural guidelines to cope with the Nova
Scotia issues. Amici contended that these procedures were a precon-
dition to enforcement. In rejecting this view, the Eleventh Circuit
relied on the lower court's finding that the agreement constituted
neither a formal bilateral agreement nor a binding U.S.
obligation. 160
The United Kingdom also relied upon an existing multilateral
agreement to which the United States is a party.' 6 1 The Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 requires governmental coopera-
tion between the signatory nations for specified criminal matters.
Yet, as the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, this cooperation is condi-
tioned on due regard for each country's constitutional, legal, and ad-
ministrative systems. Based on this limitation the court concluded
that the Restatement balancing test1 6 2 is applicable to a multilateral
assistance treaty that is limited by domestic considerations.1 63 In
reaching defendant's final argument the Eleventh Circuit held that
the act of state doctrine is not a proper vehicle for limiting the en-
forcement of a federal grand jury subpoena. That doctrine is
designed to prevent judicial disruption of foreign relations. Under
the act of state doctrine, courts presiding over civil actions are pro-
hibited from reviewing the validity of a foreign sovereign's internal
actions. By its very nature, the doctrine is not suited for challenging,
in federal court, the enforceability of a federal grand jury
157 Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d at 826.
158 Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 39-40 (1965) (the current test employs a factoral analysis, and the situs of the requested
documents is not controlling).
159 Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d at 828 nn. 17 & 18.
160 Id. at 829-30.
161 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, opened for signature Mar. 30, 1961, 18
U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204.
162 See supra note 158.
163 Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d at 831.
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subpoena. 16 4
The exhaustive review in these extraterritorial cases is in marked
contrast to the Supreme Court's review in the initial challenges to
the Bank Secrecy Act. This comity review properly reflects a concern
for maintaining harmonious foreign relations. The decisions in
these cases, however, are controversial and disruptive. Furthermore,
they are expensive in terms of delay, litigation costs, and utilization
of available resources. As an alternative, federal enforcement agen-
cies prefer,' 6 5 and the Reagan Administration has adopted, one of
the suggestions put forth in the Nova Scotia cases. Extraterritorial
application of the BSA is now realized by generalized bilateral mu-
tual assistance treaties.
b. Bilateral Mutual Assistance Agreements
A central feature of these bilateral agreements is the stipulation
to produce documents per request. Their overall effect allows for
investigation and documentation of suspected offshore criminal ac-
tivity. Investigative reliance on these agreements offers several ad-
vantages over compulsory legal process. Innocent transient financial
institutions are relieved of an unfair burden, and the use of negoti-
ated procedures effectively resolves issues of comity. These agree-
ments also establish mutual judicial assistance thereby allowing
access to offshore information. A prime example of these agree-
ments is the first one negotiated after the BSA's enactment. 166
The U.S.-Swiss mutual assistance treaty (Treaty) was signed in
1973 and seeks to combat organized crime by granting the U.S. Gov-
ernment access to heretofore private Swiss banking records. The
Treaty requires Swiss assistance even if the investigated criminal ac-
tivity is not punishable under Swiss law. 167 The Swiss Central Au-
thority' 68 is directed to disclose information normally withheld by
secrecy if: the investigation is of a serious crime, the requested infor-
mation is of substantial importance, and the United States has al-
ready made reasonable, but unsuccessful attempts to obtain
disclosure. 169 After the Treaty was implemented, it was discovered
that it was inadequate for dealing with the complexities of SEC inves-
164 Id. at 831-32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 41 (1965). The district court earlier concluded that even where the doc-
trine may apply, the decisions to seek and obtain enforcement of a federal grand jury
subpoena falls within the recognized prerogative of the executive. See Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
165 1983 Crime and Secrecy Hearings, supra note 8, at 6 (statement of D. Lowell Jensen,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., Dep't ofJustice).
166 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 26, 1973, United States-
Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter cited as Swiss Treaty].
167 Id. art. 6, § 2 & art. 7, § 1.
168 Id. art. 28, § 1.
169 Id. art. 10, § 2.
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tigations of insider trading. In 1982 the U.S. and Swiss governments
issued a supplemental agreement allowing access to financial infor-
mation useful in tracing violations connected with corporate take-
overs. 170 The combined result of these agreements is an effective
medium for tracing and documenting criminal activity through a
BSA investigation. ' 7 '
The success of the Swiss experience has led to a renewed inter-
est in the use of bilateral mutual assistance treaties. Preference for
this approach is illustrated by the fact that of the eight existing agree-
ments, seven have been concluded by the Reagan Administration. In
addition to Switzerland, similar agreements are in force with Canada,
Morocco, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and
the Cayman Islands.17 2
The efficacy of these agreements is severely limited by the fact
that only a true multilateral convention will combat the problems as-
sociated with the world-wide availability of bank secrecy.' 73 Without
multilateral assistance, criminal activity will simply shift to the next
available secrecy jurisdiction. The United Nations offers a viable fo-
rum for negotiating such an agreement, and the Reagan Administra-
tion should rechannel its efforts through that forum. The rapid
internationalization of U.S. markets provides the incentive for such
an agreement if it is presumed that U.S. dollars and businesses seek
170 Memorandum of Understanding to Establish a Mutually Acceptable Means for Im-
proving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading, Aug.
24, 1982, United States-Switzerland, reprinted in 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1983). This
supplemental agreement relies on the procedure established by a private agreement
reached by the Swiss Banker's Association with its members. Id. at 7.
171 The first indictment stemming from the combined agreements came down inJanu-
ary 1986. Agins, Ex-Director of Santa Fe International Accused of Insider Trading in Takeover,
Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1986, at 6, col. 2. The defendants in this case eventually agreed to
disgorge their profits. Ingersoll, Foreign Investors to Give Up $7.8 Million in Santa Fe Interna-
tional Insider Case, Wall St.J., Feb. 27, 1986, at 5, col. 2.
There is little doubt that the treaty has eroded the secrecy formerly associated with
the Swiss bank accounts. Putha, Those Famed Swiss Bank Accounts Aren't Quite as Impenetrable
as They Used to Be, Wall St. J., June 20, 1986, at 21, col. 4.
172 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, United States-
Canada, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1092 (1985);
The Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Oct. 17, 1983, United States-
Morocco, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in S. TREATY Doc. No. 24, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-6; Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 9, 1982, United States-
Italy, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in S. TREATY Doc. No. 25, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
1-7; Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 12, 1981, United States-
Netherlands, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 48
(1982); Agreement Extending Agreement on Criminal Investigations, July 8-15, 1980,
United States-Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 1925, T.I.A.S. No. 9810.
The treaty between the United States and the Cayman Islands, yet to be ratified, was
reported in the press. Pasztor & Nazario, U.S. Will Gain Access to Bank Records on Cayman
Islands Under New Treaty, Wall St. J., July 3, 1986, at 5, col. I.
The most recent agreement was with Great Britain. Ingersoll & Truell, U.S., Britain
Reach Accord to Help Police World Market in Securities, Commodities, Wall St.J., Sept. 24, 1986, at
12, col. 1.
173 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions safe from the criminal activity associated with offshore
secrecy laws.
IV. The Unresolved Issue: Is the Bank Secrecy Act Constitutional?
Bilateral agreements offer a viable context for extraterritorial
application of the Bank Secrecy Act. They convert a domestic statute
into an offshore investigative device for criminal behavior having do-
mestic repercussions. This valuable device remains effective as long
as it is determined that the BSA is constitutionally valid. The
Supreme Court of the United States has not ruled otherwise; none-
theless, its failure to adequately address the first and fifth amend-
ment challenges has produced two issues. First, if such challenges to
the Act's regulatory structure are eventually successful, the Act's
benefits will cease. To leave this question unresolved places at risk
the vast resources already expended to ensure the Act's continued
effectiveness. Second, the Court's failure to fully review the chal-
lenges presented in California Banker's 174 has resulted in a tendency
to give the holding in that case a rather narrow reading. The Court's
opinion, although drawn from plaintiffs' privacy arguments, is not
limited to an application of fourth amendment law. Rather, the hold-
ing in that case is a further recognition by the Court of the plenary
power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. In-
deed, the Court has abdicated judicial review of congressional regu-
lation of commerce. ' 75
A. The Privacy Issue Revisited
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that organizations of
private individuals have standing under the first amendment to chal-
lenge governmental abridgement of their fundamental liberties of
privacy and freedom of association.1 76 These holdings stem from a
realization that the first amendment protects the right of people to
associate together in striving for legitimate, and possibly controver-
sial, political and socio-economic goals. A recognition of privacy fur-
thers the fundamental liberties of association, speech, and belief by
inhibiting governmental access to information on an organization's
constituency and their behavior patterns. In theory, this denial of
information furthers the fundamental rights referred to because it
precludes any threat of governmental harassment that could possibly
be directed at a politically unpopular group.
174 California Banker's, 416 U.S. at 21.
175 See infra notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
176 See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Gibson v. Florida Legisla-
tive Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366




The BSA is, therefore, prone to first amendment challenges be-
cause organizations view its investigative reach as an abridgment of
their fundamental right of association. A thorough review of an or-
ganization's financial records reveals not only the constituency of the
group, but supplies governmental agencies with a broad range of be-
havioral patterns of each constituent as well. Compounding the
problem is the Act's failure to require customer notification of a BSA
investigation, and the express authorization for interagency ex-
change of this information.177 Furthermore, the financial institution
lacks a sufficient adversarial interest to challenge the requested dis-
closure. This situation-information about an organization's mem-
bership, along with evidence of each member's socio-economic
behavioral patterns, accessed and exchanged on a governmental
level, without notice and an opportunity to challenge process-is ex-
actly the problem the first amendment is designed to reach. Essen-
tially, it is the contention that the Court in California Banker's failed to
address. 178
This problem, and the ACLU's argument, are effectively re-
dressed by the customer notice provisions mandated by the Federal
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.179 As a general rule, similar
procedural protection is also found in state financial privacy
legislation. ' 80
Mandatory recordkeeping and reporting requirements have also
been successfully challenged under the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination. t8 ' This analysis evolves from an earlier
Supreme Court case in which a regulatory scheme was upheld
against a fifth amendment challenge.' 8 2
In the earlier case, the defendant's conviction for making tie-in
sales was based on the inculpatory evidence contained in business
records required under the 1942 Emergency Price Control Act.' 83
Defendant argued that a conviction stemming from information he
was required to keep is barred by the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The Court disagreed; the fifth amendment privilege, extend-
able to private papers, is not applicable to required business
records. ' 8 4
Two decades later this "required records" doctrine was inter-
preted as establishing three standards to be used in determining if
177 See supra notes 27-54 and accompanying text.
178 416 U.S. 21 at 75-76 (1973).
179 See generally 12 U.S.C. § 3409 (1982) (the RFPA calls for customer notification
whenever a federal agency requests financial information of that person's account; once
notified the customer can challenge the request).
180 See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
181 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
182 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1947).
183 Id. at 3. See Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
184 Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 32-34.
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required records violate the ban against self-incrimination. Re-
quired records do not violate the ban if: (1) they are similar to busi-
ness records customarily kept by individuals and organizations, (2)
their subject matter is not fundamentally private, and (3) the activity
required to be reported is essentially noncriminal in nature and is a
proper subject for governmental regulation.' 85 Applying these three
standards to the mandatory recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments established by section 4403 of the 1954 Tax Code,186 the
Court held that the required records violated the privilege against
self-incrimination. Such records were not customarily kept and con-
tained essentially private information that had the potential to sub-
ject the individual to real and substantial hazards of self-
incrimination. 18 7
Applying the Marchetti analysis to BSA's required records effec-
tively resolves the fifth amendment challenge in favor of the Act's
constitutionality. The required information has been customarily
maintained by financial institutions and the reported financial activity
is not, in and of itself, criminal in nature. Nor is it private under the
analysis presented in the California Banker's and Miller decisions.' 88
Resolution and consequent dismissal of these constitutional chal-
lenges clears the way for a proper understanding of the Court's ap-
proach in California Banker's.
B. The Commerce Clause Argument
The Supreme Court has never appeared to doubt the constitu-
tionality of the Bank Secrecy Act. Judicial review of the Act has been
strictly limited to the privacy issues derived from the Katz line of
analysis.' 89 Other than the consideration given to the privacy argu-
ments, the Court's examination of the BSA's mandatory provisions is
cursory; the Bank Secrecy Act is a valid exercise of Congress' power
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.' 90 The Court recog-
nizes this power as plenary and limited only by the Constitution it-
self. That the Court construes this power as broadly as possible is
revealed by the lack of discussion of this point in California
Banker's. 19'
The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate inter-
state and foreign commerce. 192 The commerce clause, however, can
185 Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 55-57.
186 I.R.C. § 4403 (1954).
187 Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 53-58. See also Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
382 U.S. 70 (1968) (compulsory registration of Communist Party members barred by the
privilege against self-incrimination).
188 See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
189 Id.
190 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
191 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
192 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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also serve as a pretext for congressional regulation of local and indi-
vidual activity when it can be shown that the lack of the regulation
will adversely affect interstate and foreign commerce. 193 This valid
exercise of administrative power reaches local and individual activity
when Congress has found that these actions contribute to a national
problem. Regulation of the national problem, via regulation of local
and individual activity, is a sufficiently related means of accomplish-
ing commerce regulation once Congress has determined that the ag-
gregate effect of the targeted activity results in a national problem
which adversely impacts on interstate and foreign commerce. 194
Such pretextual use is a proper exercise of commerce clause power
and is only limited by the specific prohibitions enumerated in the
U.S. Constitution. ' 95
Therefore, a proper use of commerce power includes regula-
tions designed to trace local criminal financial activity if Congress
has concluded that the aggregate of this activity is a national problem
which impacts adversely on interstate and foreign commerce. 196
When the legislative history reveals such a congressional finding, the
Court's inquiry ends. This abdication ofjudicial review is grounded
on the presumption that congressional findings have a rational basis.
This rational basis is assured by a process that has been specifically
delegated to Congress by the Constitution. The Court considers
both the process and the presumption to be beyond challenge. 197
These precedents control the determination that the Bank Se-
crecy Act is a sufficiently related means of regulating commerce.
The legislative history reveals the necessary congressional finding.
"The legislation was directed toward Americans and those doing
business in the United States, and the administrative agency se-
lected, the Treasury Department, was given wide flexibility to assure
the uninterrupted flow of international commerce and trade."' 98
Because Congress has determined that local white-collar crime re-
193 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards
Act's requirement for employer maintained records). "This power, like all others vested
in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
194 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
195 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
196 Perez, 402 U.S. at 146.
197 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
198 H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970). The Supreme Court's opinion
in California Banker's Association v. Schultz acknowledges and applies these controlling
principles.
We see no reason to reach a different result here. The plenary authority of
Congress over both interstate and foreign commerce is not open to dispute,
and that body was not limited to any one particular approach to effectuate its
concern that negotiable instruments moving in the channels of that com-
merce were significantly aiding criminal enterprise.
416 U.S. at 46.
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sults in a national problem that has a negative impact on interstate
and foreign commerce, it may, by pretext, regulate that problem pur-
suant to legislation enacted under the authority of the Commerce
Clause.
V. Conclusion
Burgeoning white-collar crime poses a significant threat to the
U.S. economy. Its goal is economic gain, and it has the potential to
exist within the context of any successful enterprise. This criminal
activity is complex, sophisticated, and characterized by stealth.
Although countless testimony since the 1960s has documented the
existence of this problem, because of available bank secrecy, the full
extent of the problem is yet to be revealed. The criminality, how-
ever, that has been evidenced clearly suggests that the problem ex-
ists on a transnational scale, posing significant risks of economic
injury and market destabilization. It is one thing to announce a war
against this type of criminal activity. It is an entirely different matter
to fashion an effective weapon against it.
Congress realized both of these goals-with its enactment of the
Bank Secrecy Act. The Act's investigative usefulness stems from the
fact that financial activity produces an inevitable paper trail. When
the activity is criminal, a reconstruction of this trail allows law en-
forcement agencies to trace transactions back to the criminal source,
thereby yielding the evidence necessary for effective prosecution.
BSA's mandatory provisions result in the recordation of this paper
trail and ensures agency access via required institutional reporting.
That the Act has been successful as a crime-fighting tool can be mea-
sured by its resultant preclusion of domestic banking secrecy.
Ironically, this success has cast the problem in a new light. In
pursuit of financial secrecy, criminal activity has migrated offshore to
avoid the Act's jurisdictional reach. Because modern technology is
creating a cohesion of the world's marketplaces, this offshore activity
continues to pose substantial risk of domestic economic harm. Thus,
it is another indicia of the BSA's success as a strong crime-fighting
tool to note the rapid and effective extraterritorial application of its
evidentiary provisions.
Because of resort to compulsory process, the initial offshore ap-
plications of the Act were considered controversial and disruptive of
U.S. foreign affairs. These comity issues have been redressed by a
current willingness to apply the Act's provisions within the context
of bilateral assistance agreements. The international effectiveness of
the Act can be considerably enhanced if it is the subject of a multilat-
eral judicial assistance convention that includes known secrecy
jurisdictions.
The BSA has a broad investigative reach that embraces both the
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honest citizen and the criminal. Admittedly there is a tension be-
tween the need for such a reach and its infringement on expectations
of financial privacy. Whether such expectations are legitimate can be
gauged to a limited degree by the insistency with which they are as-
serted. More significantly, legitimacy of these expectations is de-
ductible from the Supreme Court's several, though nebulous,
recognitions of privacy as an adjunct of the fundamental right of
liberty. 199
When a tension exists between governmental need and a citi-
zen's rights the Court must review the competing claims to deter-
mine the validity of the goal sought and the relationship of the
means to achieve it. When historical acquiescence in allowing regu-
latory access to a bank's business records is combined with the cli-
ent's absence of a possessory interest, the ensuing result tends to
validate the Bank Secrecy Act's broad, mandatory provisions. Fur-
thermore, the threat that white-collar crime poses to U.S. commerce
prompted Congress to respond to that threat with a delegation of
commerce power, which is plenary and beyond the scope ofjudicial
review. The historical acquiescence, the customer's lack of a prop-
erty interest, and the broad delegation of a broadly read constitu-
tional power, produce a fundamental basis for the Bank Secrecy Act.
This basis does not deny the fact that expectations of financial pri-
vacy exist, or that their rationale is less than persuasive. Nonethe-
less, the politics of contraband, as constitutionally modified by the
presence of procedural safeguards, 200 outweigh the claim that these
reasonable and socially acceptable privacy expectations should be
paramount.
-JAMES E. ELDRIDGE
199 See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 39; Katz, 389 U.S. at 347; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
200 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982). See supra notes 90-106 and accompanying
text.
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